







This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 46 (5), pp. 821-844.
The final definitive version is available online:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2018.1523089
© 2018 Taylor & Francis
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
THE PLURAL SOCIETY:
LABOUR AND THE COMMONWEALTH IDEA 1900-1964
Abstract:
The Labour Party founded in 1900 necessarily confronted the imperial nature of 
the British state, the empire as an economic and military entity, and the 
inequalities it contained. Yet Labour initially thought on the subject primarily in 
terms of the liberal objective of the advancement of self-government. It was only 
in the 1930s, in the writings of Lansbury and Attlee, that more systematic thinking 
about the empire in terms of global divisions of labour of which the British working 
class were among the beneficiaries, began to emerge. Tensions between the 
perceived interests of these beneficiaries and of the working classes of the empire 
as a whole remained in Attlee's postwar government. It did, however, begin to 
develop a reconceptionalisation of the empire as a multi-racial Commonwealth. 
This facilitated a Labour patriotism around the Commonwealth that reached its 
apogee in Gaitskell's weaponising of it as a means of resisting European entry in 
1962. Yet the economic and military relations he evoked were already out of date, 
leaving his successor, Harold Wilson, to adjust to a multi-racial partnership. 
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When the British Labour Party was founded in February 1900, it emerged in the 
metropole of an imperial state and in the midst of the first imperial war to be 
fought as an empire. Imperialism was thus one of the central political realities 
confronting the new party, whether in the form of the projection of power at the 
imperial frontier, the role of the empire in providing the raw materials for Britain's 
industries and foodstuffs, or in the politics of oppression across its vast extent. The 
latter - in the form of Chinese indentured labour in South Africa - was indeed a 
major issue in the 1906 election which saw Labour's breakthrough to 30 seats in 
parliament. The empire thus raised, in more extreme and racially varied forms, 
similar issues about exploitation, oppression and inequality to those the party had 
been created to confront in Britain. To this can be added the duty these newly 
elected Labour politicians had to hold to account those British ministers who were 
responsible for administering the empire, a responsibility that Labour ministers 
were themselves to exercise in 1924, 1929-31 and 1945-51.
The party thus emerged at a point when thinking about empire more generally 
within British society was arguably in transition. A year before Kipling had, in the 
context of American imperialism, identified and popularised the 'White Man's 
Burden'; the Mission Civilisatrise of imperial development. The contemporary Boer 
War was, however, also to raise in the mind of J. A. Hobson the idea of empire as 
economic exploitation and, in that of Joseph Chamberlain - faced with intimations 
of British imperial decline - the need for closer military and economic co-operation 
across the empire.1 As C. Delisle Burns observed in an official Labour publication in 
1925, without quite capturing these complex nuances, modern empires were thus 
economic rather than military: 'Imperialism was the faith of those who believed 
that this expansion of their nation was for the good of the peoples governed as 
well as for the development of the whole world'. It was thus also an idea, as Burns 
noted, actively promoted throughout the empire through the innovation of Empire 
Day from 1902, through school textbooks and indeed through the spread of tropes 
of Britishness and of British forms of Christianity across its length. 
Empire, as Burns acknowledged, thus posed a number of challenges to the new 
party. There was the electoral problem of the conflation of imperialism with 
patriotism given that 'Imperialism is necessarily opposed to Socialism, not only 
because Socialism looks towards international peace, but also because Socialism 
is opposed to private advantages gained at the expense of the common good'. 
Empire at the same time raised the policy issue of responding to the needs of the 
'common men of other lands'.2
This posed the challenge of thinking of the empire as an interconnected system in 
which the British working classes were among the beneficiaries. In the process it 
therefore raises the question of whether, when Labour writers waxed lyrical - as 
they were wont to do until the 1940s - on the Socialist Commonwealth that was to 
come, did they also include in that the Commonwealth that already existed as an 
appellation for those parts of empire which had been given some form of self-
governing autonomy, let alone the imperial whole? Often the answer appears to 
be no. Consider G. D. H. Cole, one of the leading left-wing thinkers and 
popularisers of the inter-war years. His 1918 tome, Labour in the Commonwealth, 
attempted to think through how Labour could achieve its place in a state - 
specifically the British one - rather than the wider issue of the place of labour 
across the vaster realms of the empire.3 It has also been suggested that at the 
official level the new party's references to Commonwealth similarly tended to be 
concerned with the Socialist, rather than the imperial, variety.4 Take, for instance, 
the statement of The Aims of Labour, published the year before Cole's work by 
Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party's general secretary, as part of the re-launch of 
the party he and Sidney Webb masterminded to prepare it for the world emerging 
after the Great War.5 The empire may have been heavily involved in supporting 
Britain's war efforts militarily, commercially and financially (for instance, George 
Lansbury claimed in 1935 that India contributed £100m to the British war effort, 
spent £207.5m on its own military campaigns and contributed greatly to saving 
the Channel ports in 1914-15),6 and it was to reach its greatest extent in its 
immediate aftermath. It was, however, passed over in silence by Henderson.
The limited attention Labour paid to imperial matters before 1914 was 
understandable given that it remained a small party which could influence the 
governing Liberals but not yet aspire to replace them. For instance, in 1906 it 
joined the Liberals in condemning 'Chinese Slavery'. In general, however, the 
essence of Labour's thinking about the empire in the Edwardian era was expressed 
in the aspiration contained in party's first election manifesto in 1900 for 
'Legislative Independence for all parts of the Empire'.7 This would thus extend 
throughout the dependent empire the legislative autonomy already achieved by 
then in the 'White' Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
Newfoundland, to be shortly joined by the Union of South Africa in 1910.
The problems with such an approach became apparent to the party when, in April 
1914, the Labour MP Frank Goldstone initiated a debate in the Commons on the 
applicability of Magna Carta, Habeas Corpus and the Petition of Right across the 
empire, calling for their inviolability to be assured in every self-governing 
Dominion.8 This is an early example of thinking about the empire systematically, 
rather than imperial wrongs in particular territories, notably India, Ireland, and 
South Africa. In calling this debate in light of the alarming handling and aftermath 
of the mines dispute in South Africa in 1913, Labour clearly were expressing a 
sense of responsibility for the empire as a whole. This was even more apparent 
when Henderson (notwithstanding his silence on such issues three years later) in 
seconding the motion noted: 'It seems to me that if we were indifferent to this 
situation, especially we on the Labour benches, we would be false to the trust that 
has been reposed in us, not only by our constituents, but by crowds of organised 
workers, whom, to some extent, we represent in this House.'9
South Africa's legislative independence, however, meant that Labour's attempt to 
invoke a standard of liberty across the empire proved to be a dispiriting 
experience. Disconsolately, the Labour MP Stephen Walsh observed: 
I have been under the impression that there were certain fundamental 
principles of British law upon which all these self-governing institutions were 
to be based....In the ignorance under which we labour upon these benches 
we really thought that that fundamental condition would exist just as much 
in the South African Dominions as in our own country, that there should be 
no person outlawed or exiled, that justice should not be sold and should not 
be deferred, that no man should be deprived of his fundamental liberties, 
except through trial by his peers.'10
Such difficulties seem to have been largely overlooked when Labour for the first 
time included a substantial passage (albeit only two pages long) on empire and 
Commonwealth policy in an official party publication. This was Labour and the New 
Social Order, a statement of post-war aims largely drafted by Henderson and 
Webb and revised at the party conference in June 1918. The aspirations of Joseph 
Chamberlain and his later acolytes such as Lionel Curtis for some kind of imperial 
federation were roundly condemned as implying a dangerous subjection to a 
common imperial legislature coercing tax and military services, invading the 
autonomy of the Dominions and - by the imposition of imperial duties - 
undermining the democratic freedom of choice in the United Kingdom itself. 
Labour, the publication proclaimed, did not want parliament to become an imperial 
senate representing the plutocracies of the empire. Instead:
With regard to that great Commonwealth of all races, all colours, all 
religions and all degrees of civilisation, that we call the British Empire, the 
Labour Party stands for its maintenance and its progressive development on 
the lines of Local Autonomy and 'Home Rule All Round'; the fullest respect 
for the rights of each people, whatever its colour, to all the Democratic Self-
Government of which it is capable, and to the proceeds of its own toil upon 
the resources of its own territorial home, and the closest possible co-
operation among all the various members of what has become essentially 
not an Empire in the old sense, but a Britannic Alliance.
There are certain omissions and contradictions here. The prime omission relates to 
what was arguably the most obvious manifestation of the empire as a political 
entity, particularly at the end of a war in which its resources had been massively 
deployed to the waging of it: the core military functions. On this Labour had 
seemingly nothing to say.
Labour and the New Social Order had a little more to say on the economics of 
empire. Its disavowal of all claims for territorial or economic gain is clear. Yet there 
is no attempt to think through the challenges of the power disparities raised by the 
mention of plutocracy. Pre-war thinking about cross-national class alliances 
against economic or other forms of oppression, as exemplified by the Second 
International's failed pledge to hold a general strike in the event of war, is 
conspicuously absent. That Labour might have a responsibility, even if only a 
paternalistic one, to assist the development of labour movements in the 
Dominions and colonies and unite with them in common witness against economic 
exploitation is also missing. 
Furthermore, there is a potential contradiction between the stated objection to all 
protective tariffs and the principle that nonetheless 'we hold that each nation must 
be left free to do what it thinks best for its own economic development, without 
thought of injuring others'.11 If all parts of empire could autonomously pursue what 
was locally in their perceived economic interests, including the UK, then avoiding 
competitive economic nationalism would likely prove challenging. A consequence 
was the regrettable effect of Indian tariffs on the Lancashire cotton industry noted 
and accepted by Burns.12 Oddly, and notwithstanding Goldstone's initiative in 
1914, Labour does not in 1918 even seem to think about this in terms of minimal 
labour regulation. There is plenty on this subject in the rest of the document, but 
nothing in the section on empire, despite Labour's contemporary role in the 
creation of the International Labour Office [ILO] as a key organ of the League of 
Nations. 
The other dimensions of empire that emerge in Labour and the New Social Order 
are as a social and constitutional entity. In terms of the former there is a clear 
appreciation of social and cultural variety and a commitment to inclusive respect 
for rights. There is, however, a vagueness about what this entails, particularly 
given the problem of how this respect for rights can be imposed on autonomous 
Dominions like South Africa. This reflects the fundamental contradictions within 
Labour's approach to the empire as a constitutional entity. The aspiration is for 
local autonomy, which clearly should include India, where Labour favoured a 
democratic transition far in advance of the contemporary Montagu-Chelmsford 
plans being formulated by the Lloyd George Coalition. The document is, however, 
ambiguous about how far this might extend to the dependent parts of empire 
more generally. 
How this local autonomy is consistent with at the same time seeking 'the closest 
possible co-operation' among the members of empire is studiously unclear. In 
these circumstances how could such co-operation be secured? Labour's 
suggestion herein is to transform the imperial conferences which had developed 
among the Dominions since the 1880s into annual Imperial Councils, which would 
consult on matters of common interest and make recommendations for 
simultaneous consideration across the legislatures of what would be constituted as 
an 'Alliance of Free Nations'.13 Its understanding of how this Alliance might work as 
a system thus seems to rest on a weak confederalism, united only by unmentioned 
ties of sentiment and the equally unmentioned symbol of the Crown. In this a 
liberal parliamentarianism appears to have trumped a wider commitment to 
socialistic raising of the well-being of the workers as a class spread across the 
empire. Indeed, this parliamentarianism was apparently dominant over the 
aspiration even for minimal liberal standards of equality before the law across the 
empire that Labour had voiced in the Goldstone debate. The Socialist 
Commonwealth Labour dreamt of seemingly then did not extend across the seas.
This liberal parliamentarianism is marked in the first reference to the term 
'Commonwealth' in connection with empire in a Labour manifesto in 1918, when 
the party promised to 'extend to all subject peoples the right of self-determination 
within the British Commonwealth of Free Nations'.14 How far party figures really 
thought that this aspiration could actually be achieved remains, however, a matter 
of conjecture. Sidney Webb, who went on to serve as the party's first Dominions 
Secretary in 1929-30, certainly seems to have been dubious. In 1913 he noted 
that in many parts of the empire 'it would be idle to pretend that anything like 
effective self-government, even as regards strictly local affairs, can be introduced 
for many generations to come - in some cases conceivably never'.15 Thus although 
there was certainly a desire in Labour to transform the empire into a 
commonwealth of free nations (not peoples, given the tendency to overlook the 
oppression of indigenous populations in White Dominions other than South Africa) 
this was not necessarily considered practical politics.
The other facet of the development of Labour's thinking about the empire that 
might be remarked upon is the way that it was then compartmentalised. Unlike 
the Tories, Labour did not overtly recognise empire as a central characteristic of 
the British state and its economic and political order.16 It also tended to 
compartmentalise empire in a racialised hierarchy.17 Burns commented in 1925: 
'The Labour Movement had always a vague affection for all members of the British 
race beyond the seas, but was hardly aware of the problems of the tropics before 
the Labour Party came into existence'.18 In many ways the same prism of 
Britishness seems still very much present in his thinking in the 1920s. Consider 
Burns' comment about South Africa: 'No one, of course, wants the white 
civilisation to be swamped by barbarism, but a real native civilisation can be 
developed side by side with the European'.19 In 1928 a memorandum to the 
second Commonwealth Labour conference divided the empire along similar 
civilisational lines into European (including the West Indies), Oriental and 
primitive.20 This mindset derived from nineteenth century racial hierarchies 
ensured that the empire thus remained external and paternal.
Nor was the empire integrated into Labour thinking on Britain's international role. 
Empire played no part, either as a military or a geopolitical entity, in the 
discussion of Labour's foreign policy set out by Ramsay MacDonald in 1923, 
shortly before he became simultaneously the party's first Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary the following January, except as a repository for British foreign 
direct investments.21 MacDonald was more concerned about opposing the factors 
which he felt had prompted a war he opposed breaking out in 1914, and spent his 
first ten months in government concentrating on promoting better relations across 
Europe and in Russia, rather than giving much thought to either the 
Commonwealth or the empire.22 There was, nonetheless, reference in the 1924 
election manifesto to MacDonald's administration's alleged success in 
strengthening 'the ties of sentiment with the Dominions upon which, rather than 
upon either force or any Imperialism, the very existence of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations depends'.23 As a sign of this, the first conference of 
Commonwealth Labour parties was held the following year, though only India was 
represented alongside the 'White' Dominions.24 Followed by similar conferences in 
1928 and 1930, this marked Labour starting to think systematically about empire. 
By the time of the statement of party policy, Labour and the Nation in 1927, co-
operation across the 'Dominions and Dependencies....to take common action for 
the promotion of a higher standard of social and economic life for the working 
population of the respective countries' had become one of the aims of the party.25
The Communist Party, following Lenin's adaptation of Hobson's ideas, may have in 
contrast seen empire as economic exploitation and therefore as a constant threat 
to peace.26 In the 1920s, however, the efforts of Chamberlain's acolyte, Leo 
Amery, as Dominions Secretary in the Tory government of 1924-29 to promote 
economic co-operation and colonial development across the empire was probably 
a more important context for the development of Labour thinking on imperial 
matters. It was against this backdrop that the backbench MP, Leslie Haden-Guest, 
established a Commonwealth Labour Group of MPs. About 20-30 MPs seem to 
have regularly attended its weekly meetings. Its core, however, was a small group 
of figures like James Thomas - who had served as Labour's first Colonial Secretary 
in 1924 - now moving away from free trade towards Chamberlainite ideas of 
imperial preference and common external tariffs. For them such devices, and the 
tied loans Thomas also advocated, were a way of tackling domestic 
unemployment. This line of thinking culminated in the proposal for 'schemes of 
development with Crown Colonies involving considerable expenditure on 
equipment manufactured....in Britain' put forward in the report resulting from the 
trades union talks with industry initiated after the 1926 General Strike and issued 
in March 1929.27 Such ideas also featured in Labour's 1929 manifesto and led to 
the passage of the colonial development legislation largely developed by Amery 
under MacDonald's incoming second government.
This growing focus on imperial economic development was marked in other ways 
as well in the 1920s. One example was the endorsement of bulk purchase 
agreements for colonial products at the 1925 party conference. This could be seen 
as beneficially offering guaranteed markets for these products. That such 
arrangements might lock colonies into economic subservience and discourage 
diversification, while the prime beneficiary would be a metropolitan power 
dependent on imports for some 60 per cent of its foodstuffs, does not seem to 
have been noticed, even by the left-winger George Lansbury (who succeeded 
Haden-Guest as head of the Labour Commonwealth Group in 1927), for whom they 
were merely the first step towards international co-operation.28
Another scheme for the economic development of the empire emerged at the 1927 
party conference. This was idea of the surveying the vast land resources of the 
empire 'with a view to subordinating the private use of land to the general interest 
of a scientific redistribution of the population'.29 Imperial emigration was also to be 
encouraged, despite the lack of enthusiasm of Dominion labour parties.30 As Labour 
and the Nation (1927) made clear, even the primacy of native welfare invoked 
therein was structured around protecting them from policies that would be injurious 
to them but also, by preventing wage competition, to the working classes of 
Europe.31 
Labour thinking on the military dimension of empire did not really develop in the 
1920s, beyond considering the Committee of Imperial Defence too powerful.32 To 
this there was later in 1935 also added a concern raised by the left-wing 
backbencher, Aneurin Bevan, about how far the Dominions were represented on this 
important body, and whether they had been consulted on the recent rearmament 
White Paper.33 On the constitution of the empire there was meanwhile some 
movement through the application of the concept of trusteeship developed under 
the League of Nations to the empire in general. The revised edition of Labour and 
the Nation in 1928 thus spoke of extending the oversight of the League's Mandates 
Commission to the dependent empire and therein extending political rights already 
granted to Europeans as part of the preparations for self-government.34 The 
important developments in imperial constitutional practice presaged by the 1926 
Balfour Declaration, however, went unmentioned in these documents.
The ensuing Labour government of 1929-31 and its immediate aftermath seems to 
have marked a transition point in a number of ways. It began with the Colonial 
Development Act 1929, into S.1(2) of which safeguards for fair wages and 
conditions, proscription on forced labour and the participation of the colonial 
territory in any increases in value resulting from the investment were all written 
in. Such concerns had not hitherto been conspicuous in party pronouncements on 
empire, but they were to become increasingly noticeable in the 1930s. Secondly, 
the Labour government was faced with taking forward the long-voiced 
commitment to Dominion status for India following the Irwin Declaration of 
October 1929,35 a process complicated by the Viceroy imprisoning Gandhi the 
following May. Thirdly, while progress towards self-government in India stalled, the 
formal co-equal independence of the Dominions was recognised by the December 
1931 Statute of Westminster. This welcome development from the Balfour 
Declaration fulfilled a long-standing Labour goal, but by then the government had 
fallen from power and been reduced to a parliamentary rump by the National 
Government landslide of October 1931. Fourthly, that National Government in 
1932 negotiated a system of imperial preference commonly known as the Ottawa 
tariffs. During the 1930s they were also to preside over the consolidation of the 
empire financially through the development of the Sterling Area.
Labour thinking on empire and Commonwealth thus did not operate in a vacuum 
but necessarily reflected the actions of their political opponents. Another 
important contextual factor was Labour's interpretation of the circumstances of 
the fall of their government and subsequent heavy defeat in 1931. The idea that 
this was the result of a 'Bankers' Ramp' gave substance to the hitherto shadowy 
idea of some kind of international plutocracy. This resulted in a more critical 
appraisal of capitalist exploitation across the empire, as well as in Britain. With 
Lansbury as party leader from 1932-35, there was accordingly a shift away from 
the liberal parliamentarianism which had characterised party thinking in the 
1920s. Lansbury's Labour's Way with the Commonwealth in 1935 instead voiced 
for the first time a recognition of informal power structures, including 
constitutional facades of sham democracy in Southern Rhodesia and the West 
Indies, and the informal empire exercised by the British through their Portuguese 
satellite.36 
An economic critique of empire, which had hitherto only been vaguely expressed, 
also began to emerge. Lansbury thus pointed to the way in which monopolistic 
trading companies exploited West African colonies, while in East Africa land 
seizures had been combined with the iniquitous hut tax to supply European 
settlers with a cheap supply of landless African labourers.37 Similarly, a language 
of economic development was mere empty piety with the high land rents, 
cartelized labour markets and weak trade unions, and the enormous fiscal burden 
of 62.5% of taxes going on defence in India. Lansbury also, almost uniquely among 
the literature consulted for this paper, also drew attention to (some of) the 
particular disabilities experienced by women in India.38 None of this would be 
resolved, he argued, by the Government of India Act 1935, which dropped the 
aspiration to Dominion status and, by preserving the sclerotic system of dyarchy, 
militated against responsible government.39
Such iniquities were intrinsically related to the 'colour bar'. 'With the possible 
exception of the Maoris', Lansbury complained, no 'native race has been admitted 
to full equality with the white inhabitants'.40 The complicity of Dominion labour 
movements in this failing and the possible consequences for British Labour was 
bitterly acknowledged, particularly when 'South Africa may be laying the 
foundation of a racial war in which we shall be involved'.41 Across the empire as a 
whole, the result of this 'colour bar' was the forcing of indigenous peoples into the 
global market 'under terribly low standards, to compete white people out of the 
markets'.42 In the final chapter of the book, by Charles Roden Buxton with the 
somewhat unfortunate title 'Policy in Backward Colonies', there was therefore 
emphasis on the need to apply the ILO's 1930 Forced Labour Convention. 
Ultimately the hope was that the ILO would 'draw up a general code of regulations 
applicable to all tropical colonies'. This, the development of trade unions and more 
widespread education, were all seen as necessary to protect against exploitation 
both by settlers and by native elites. This need to protect against 'irresponsible 
buccaneers' thus became an additional rationale for the continuance of British 
trusteeship.43 
It was not, however, grounds for the economic integration of the empire through 
the Ottawa system. Indeed, that system was seen as enforcing the existing racial 
divisions of labour within the empire and of hardening imbalances of trade and 
debt. Lansbury did not envisage some prototype of Schumacher and Keynes' 
Bancor scheme as a way of addressing this.44 His critique did, however, lead him 
to emphasise the ideals of Commonwealth reciprocity 'as a means for leading the 
world along the way to an international federation'.45 
This overarching internationalism was to be even more apparent in the writings of 
Lansbury's successor as party leader, Clement Attlee. Attlee had been general 
editor of the series in which Lansbury book appeared, and two years later he 
followed it up with his own statement on imperial and Commonwealth matters. Not 
least, he took further Lansbury's earlier critique of the economic and racial nature 
of the empire. For instance, he emphasised that the Commonwealth was 
'essentially a money-lenders' empire' and that British Labour were the 
beneficiaries of an exploitative race. This meant that the simple nostrums offered 
by the party earlier of moves towards self-government had to be resisted when 
demands for this came from settler minorities.46 This, however, might also apply 
when these same demands came from unaccountable native elites:
There is no particular gain in handing over the peasants and workers of 
India to be exploited by their own capitalists and landlords. Nationalism is a 
creed that may be sustained with great self-sacrifice and idealism, but may 
also shelter class domination, and intolerance of minorities as well as 
economic exploitation.47
The challenge for Attlee was how to apply Socialism to the actual existence of the 
Commonwealth and empire. 'Simple surrender of all ill-gotten gains was 
undesirable and unpractical [sic].' Instead, Attlee saw the way forward through 
advancing economic co-operation. An earlier support for Guild Socialism can be 
detected in his enthusiasm for the experiments of New Zealand's first Labour 
government with nationalisation of imports and exports, cutting out wasteful and 
exploitative middle-men and thereby maximising returns to producers and 
minimising costs to consumers.48 This was also a development of the import 
boards proposed by his fellow former Guild Socialist, G. D. H. Cole, during the 1931 
crash.49 Such egalitarian efficiencies, by ending self-interested distortions of 
markets would, Attlee assumed, prove a better mechanism for economic co-
operation than the Ottawa system. By promoting this co-operation across those 
Dominions 'of European stock' Labour might 'show an example of how such a 
relationship can be extended to cover all those countries which are ready to share 
in collective security and the pooling of economic resources'. For Attlee, as for 
Lansbury, the British Commonwealth was thus simply a stepping point towards a 
world Commonwealth of nations.50
Attlee's book was re-issued twelve years later, by which time he was Prime 
Minister, having served as Dominions Secretary in Churchill's wartime coalition 
from 1942-43. In his preface to this new edition the journalist Francis Williams, 
who served Attlee as his press advisor from 1945-47, claimed that the 1937 text 
had been faithfully carried out by its author in government after Labour's landslide 
victory in 1945. Although Labour were arguably even more conscious of the 
military and economic significance of empire in light of wartime experience, 
Williams thus represents imperial developments following 1945 as matters of 
degree rather than paradigm shifts. In particular, he emphasised the rapid 
decolonisation in India, Burma and Ceylon.51 Yet none of these developments had 
been explicitly foreshadowed in what Attlee wrote in 1937. 
In The Labour Party in Perspective Attlee had flagged up his concern about 
bankrupt Newfoundland, but this had not exactly prefigured the only imperial 
experience from his wartime service as Dominions Secretary Attlee actually 
mentions in his memoirs: his visit there in 1942 and subsequent support for its 
inclusion in Canada in 1949.52 He passed over in silence the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act 1940, introduced to deal with wartime financial disruption in the 
dependent empire. This breach in the principle that the colonies should be self-
supporting was the first significant foray into fiscal transfers from the metropole to 
the colonies. It was to be greatly extended by Attlee in 1945, leading to the 
creation of the Colonial Development Corporation [CDC], though this again had not 
been foreshadowed in his 1937 book. Indeed, he explicitly pointed therein to the 
difficulties of coming up with a formula to address the problems of advancement 
towards self-government over such varied territories at differing stages of political 
and economic development. This was, understandably, not so much a template for 
how to deal with events such as the Accra riots in 1948 as an indication of the 
direction of travel. It was also flexible to the international exigencies of postwar 
Britain's strategic or economic needs, as indicated by the 1946 Kenya White 
Paper.53 
The only points on which Attlee was specific were on development of education, 
safeguarding of native land and reduction of onerous taxes, nationalised 
marketing of native products and the internationalisation of these products under 
the League of Nations.54 These last objectives were not exactly mutually 
compatible. In practice Attlee's government, faced with the massive British dollar 
shortage of the postwar years and the important role colonial raw materials played 
in a reviving world economy for precious dollar earnings, focused on investment in 
and marketing of these products, not least through the Overseas Food Corporation 
(1948). Attlee had been impressed with the relative wealth of West Africa in 1937, 
but the attempt to recreate those circumstances in East Africa through the 
groundnuts scheme was foredoomed to failure.55
It has been argued that the Fabian Colonial Research Bureau founded in 1940 was 
more influential on Labour's postwar policies than any pre-war thinking.56 One of 
its moving spirits was Arthur Creech Jones, who was also chair of the party's 
advisory committee on imperial issues. Creech Jones went on to serve Attlee as 
Colonial Secretary 1946-50. In his introduction to Fabian Colonial Essays in 1945 
he argued that wartime changes for the colonies had been vast. Yet there are 
echoes of Labour thinking in the 1920s in his observation that 
Their development is necessary for the larger security of the world; their 
products and resources are wanted in the outside world; their low standards 
depress our higher levels; their disease threatens our health; their poverty, 
prejudices our prosperity - in short, these distressed areas must be 
developed and integrated as progressing regions into the commonwealth of 
free nations.57
One way of doing this was through raising the economic return to the colonies, 
though the technique for this remained the bulk purchase agreements first 
envisaged in the 1920s.58 Fabian Colonial Essays also, however, developed Labour 
thinking by for the first time sketching out ideas of how to industrialise the 
colonies using loan capital at fixed interest rates, an innovation which the veteran 
Socialist journalist H. N. Brailsford argued would also help to create markets for 
British manufacturing exports.59
Attlee himself in retrospect focused more on political developments under his 
government. In his memoirs he contrasted the alleged timeliness of grants of self-
government in India and Burma with the consequences of delay in the Dutch East 
Indies and French Indo-China.60 Subsequently he was to celebrate the unique 
success of the British in voluntarily surrendering hegemony over subject peoples.61 
Although this was certainly an overstatement his government, in particular by 
incorporating India, had undoubtedly changed the Commonwealth into something 
like a multiracial association of free nations. This was a considerable and by no 
means certain achievement given the commitment Jawaharlal Nehru and the 
Congress had to establishing an Indian republic, thereby undermining the central 
position in the Commonwealth occupied by the Crown.62 The future Labour Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, who was tangentially involved in these events as 
President of the Board of Trade, may have later described Nehru as 'in every 
sense a good Commonwealth man', but it was the willingness of the Attlee 
government to depart from monarchical arrangements that enabled this 
eventuality.63 
This outcome of India remaining in the Commonwealth after it became the first 
republic to do so 1950 was aided by the decision in 1948, at Attlee's prompting, 
that the term 'Dominion' and the prefix 'British' should be dropped, given the 
concerns Nehru had expressed about such terms since at least 1936.64 This could 
thus be seen as fulfilment of the aspirations to use the Commonwealth as a 
stepping stone to internationalisation first sketched out by Lansbury. This would 
certainly appeal to Attlee, who shared Lansbury's views in this respect and went 
on to be a leading light of the Parliamentary group for World Government after his 
retirement from the party leadership in 1955.65 These aspirations were also 
evoked in Labour's first statement of foreign policy after losing office in 1951, 
which emphasised:
The Commonwealth in its present form is the supreme example of an 
international organisation which positively helps towards the development 
of a world society, since it imposes no limitations on co-operation between 
its members and other states outside....The Labour Party, therefore, 
believes that Britain must put the Commonwealth before all other regional 
groupings.
The Attlee government, it proclaimed, had transformed the Commonwealth into 'a 
bridge between the peoples of European stock and the peoples of Asia and Africa'. 
As such, it had indicated how the party might finally accomplish its long-held 
ambition to achieve 'as rapidly as possible this peaceful transition from Empire to 
Commonwealth'. Labour's Foreign Policy also claimed that the lead given by the 
Attlee government had 'resulted in the great experiment of the Colombo Plan' of 
1950.66 The latter emerged from the Commonwealth Conference of Foreign 
Ministers held in Colombo in January 1950 with the twin aims of promoting 
economic co-operation and development in South-East Asia and thereby 
discouraging the spread of Communism.
This 1952 statement thus set out two aims for Labour's imperial policy: to further 
the transition to the Commonwealth and to promote what was starting to be called 
overseas aid. On the first of these the early 1950s were marked by interest in the 
idea of federations of colonies as a means to achieve the transition to 
independence. The party supported this in the West Indies in the 1954 draft policy 
document 'From Colonies to Commonwealth'. On economic grounds they had also 
helped to initiate such a scheme in Central Africa in the late 1940s, though they 
emphasised the need for African consent in a situation complicated by a large 
settler presence. It was therefore felt that Britain needed to retain sovereignty 
there and in East Africa for as long as was necessary 'to prevent domination by a 
racial minority, in order to ensure the achievement of democracy'.67 
These were not the only areas where the transfer of power remained problematic. 
Creech Jones, in a critical letter to the party's recently appointed Commonwealth 
officer, John Hatch, complained both that there was an insufficient emphasis on 
Socialism in 'From Colonies to Commonwealth' and that the transfer of power 
should only happen to democratic governments.68 It is not clear what Creech Jones 
had in mind, but the next iteration of the policy draft in March 1955 made clear 
party disapproval of what were seen as Communist attempts 'to use their 
constitution for the destruction of democracy' in British Guiana.69
Meanwhile, the aid agenda emerging in Colombo had already been amplified in 
Labour and the New Society in 1950. This marked an advancement from the inter-
war language of trusteeship to the inculcation of development. Insofar as there 
had been thinking on this subject in the 1930s it had been around land and 
settlement and addressed through the prism of the high unemployment Britain 
suffered in that decade. The interests of the metropole in terms of global defence 
and preventing the spread of Communism to the less-developed world as a new 
sphere of the burgeoning Cold War remained apparent in the 1950 publication. 
This is perhaps unsurprising in the year that Attlee's Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, called for Commonwealth co-operation with the Americans against 
Communism, of which the most tangible result was the British Commonwealth 
Forces Korea deployment from 1951 to 1957. This was thus the fullest example of 
Labour finally taking on the military aspects of the Commonwealth, albeit in a form 
which very much reflected the old rather than the new Commonwealth as BCFK 
was dominated by British, Canadian and Australian contributions.70
Meanwhile, Labour and the New Society largely concentrated on how to promote 
sustainable development. In pointing to the conflict between subsistence 
agriculture and export crops it foreshadowed the subsequent paper on 'Aid to 
Under-Developed Countries' by the St Lucian economist W. Arthur Lewis in May 
1952. Pointing out that most of Britain's capital movement to the less developed 
world of around £500m per year then went to South America and the Middle East, 
Lewis noted that under-developed countries could only absorb more capital if 
education and training were expanded. This would facilitate the switching of 
labour from subsidence to marketised sectors of the economy that he was to 
develop two years later in his seminal Nobel Prize-winning paper.71
After going through various internal drafts, these two policy agendas came 
together in the published version of 'From Colonies to Commonwealth'. More 
prosaically entitled Labour's Colonial Policy, this appeared in three volumes in 
1956. The first of these, The Plural Society, was Labour's most thorough attempt 
yet to think through how to achieve sustained self-government in the often deeply 
racially mixed societies of the colonies. It emphasised that Labour's aim 'is to 
encourage the peoples concerned, in their political life, to forget race and colour, 
and to think and act as human beings'. Otherwise how could Creech Jones' 
aspiration that handover occurred to democratic governments be attained? In 
societies where access to political power had long been structured around race 
this was, however, easier said than done. Indeed, the fear was expressed that 
attempts to remove racial considerations could prove so disruptive to existing 
social and political norms as to exacerbate racial tensions. Accordingly, it warned 
that it might 'be necessary to invest Governors with reserve powers for a period to 
protect legitimate minority interests against excessive nationalist ardour'. In 
contrast to the constitution-making of the previous decade, it also advised that 'for 
the protection of minorities....the principles of the [UN] Declaration of Human 
Rights' might be included in these constitutions.72 This could be seen as either 
cautious or prescient: at this stage, for instance, the Labour-supporting 
constitutional scholar, Sir Ivor Jennings, had not yet come to regret his optimistic 
omission of such provisions from the 1948 constitution of Ceylon.73
The Plural Society also stressed the need for safeguards for labour, including fair 
wages clauses which, in an earlier iteration, had been seen as essential pre-
conditions for colonial investment.74 Most of the discussion of economic policy 
towards the colonies, however, came in the aptly named second volume on 
Economic Aid, drawn up by a working party chaired by Barbara Castle. A 
restoration of the bulk purchase agreements run down by the Tories since 1951 
was promised. It also welcomed the increase in funds available to the CDC to £20-
30m a year in 1955, while arguing for increased pump-priming grants and direct 
grants to cover social investment. After all, these would thereby compensate for 
the net imports of capital from the colonies to the UK through the operation of the 
Sterling Area: 'While we have been lending money long-term to the colonies to 
build dams, railways, roads and factories, they have been lending money short-
term to us through the accumulation of sterling balances'. Labour would therefore 
now sign up, having - as Lewis pointed out - rejected it when they were in 
government, for the UN's proposed Special Fund for Economic Development and 
commit to grants of 1% of GNP per annum towards it.75 This would not only 
reverse the negative investment flows but address the lack of finance available for 
infrastructure development identified in earlier policy documents.76
The final volume of Labour's Colonial Policy addressed those Smaller Territories 
deemed unready for independence. Gone was the view, still being reiterated by 
Brailsford in 1945, that sudden independence 'would be to betray the peoples and 
our trust....[to] the penetration of the predatory and callous influences which 
socialists deplore'.77 Now only those colonies which 'are too small or possess 
insufficient resources of wealth or manpower to become full sovereign nations of 
the Commonwealth' were excluded. It was still a developmental test, but it had 
been subtly rephrased. The door was also left open for circumstances to 'so alter 
as to enable them to attain such a status'. One way this might happen was 
through the federation route. More novel was the idea, following the proposals of 
Malta's Labour Prime Minister, Dom Mintoff in 1955, for which Hatch was a great 
enthusiast, that 'we should be prepared in suitable cases....to consider 
representation at Westminster'.78 Lack of enthusiasm for the perceived welfare 
costs from the Conservative government helped to ensure that this scheme to 
nothing.79 Other proposals, such as that Cyprus - a territory deemed too small for 
independence that was then wracked with guerrilla warfare - might be resolved 
through enosis with Greece were arguably just naive.80 
As a statement of Labour's Colonial Policy these documents did not prove 
enduring. With decolonisation gathering pace under the Macmillan government it 
was decided as early as 1960 not to reprint them as they were already out of 
date.81 George Cunningham, who became the party's Commonwealth officer in 
1963, subsequently commented: 'Clearly the standards thought necessary for 
complete independence have been lowered over the years'.82 
Labour's thinking about the transition to independence had been rapidly overtaken 
by external developments. This was not the only problem with these policy 
documents. Pointing out the contradictions between the aim of rapid self-
determination for most territories and the commitment to end racial discrimination 
first, Richard Crossman commented: 'If we have to wait until all forms of racial 
discrimination have been outlawed, we shall run the colonies for the next 200 
years'.83 So far only left-wingers like Fenner Brockway had, however, raised the 
irony that Britain itself had yet to pass any legislation on the subject of racial 
discrimination;84 James Griffiths concluding just after succeeding Creech Jones as 
Colonial Secretary in 1950 that 'there is no reason to believe that either legislation 
or administrative action can profitably be undertaken' to correct what was claimed 
to be a rare issue.85
This had certainly not been seen as a major problem before 1939. Buxton indeed 
blithely stated in 1935 that 'it is generally agreed that no class is so free from race 
or colour prejudice as the working class'.86 With postwar immigration resulting in 
far more Commonwealth citizens in Britain, this issue however became 
increasingly a matter of concern for the party. The racial hierarchies of empire 
were no longer external, but now had to be confronted at home. A draft statement 
by the party's governing National Executive Committee [NEC] in 1958 estimated 
that between a quarter and a third of the British population were racially 
prejudiced - on what basis is unclear - with resulting tensions of the kind Labour 
had warned of in the colonial setting. Initially, however, Griffiths' view in 1950 that 
prejudice cannot be abolished by legislation was reiterated.87 Nonetheless, by the 
time the final draft of this policy emerged in September 1958 it had been decided 
that it should still be severely discouraged by the passage of legislation to make 
racial discrimination a criminal offence.88 With such decisions, Labour finally 
incorporated the metropole into its thinking about the plural society that the 
Commonwealth, not least through its own efforts, had become.
For some, not least with the revival of what were now multi-racial conferences of 
the various Labour parties across the Commonwealth in 1957 and 1962, this 
transformation sparked - if anything - a deepening of their attachment to the 
Commonwealth. Hugh Gaitskell, who had succeeded Attlee as party leader in 
1955, accordingly celebrated the great multi-racial bridge of the Commonwealth 
linking rich and poor countries that 'owes its creation fundamentally to those vital 
historical decisions of the Labour Government' of 1945-51. He did so in his 1962 
party conference speech in which he made clear his dislike of the attempts 
Macmillan's Tory government had launched the previous year to join the European 
Economic Community.89 Almost all the reasons Gaitskell cited for this dislike 
related to the Commonwealth. This was also true of the more balanced NEC 
statement on the subject. 'Unlike the Six', it proclaimed, 'Britain is the centre and 
founder member of a much larger and still more important group, the 
Commonwealth worldwide multi-racial association of 700 million'. If 'our 
membership were to weaken the Commonwealth and the trade of the 
underdeveloped nations, lessen the chances of East-West agreement and reduce 
the influence that Britain could exert in world affairs, then the case against entry 
would be decisive'.90 It was the multi-racial Commonwealth that was praised, but 
Gaitskell's reasons for doing so harked back to Amery and beyond. Labour had not 
usually highlighted the Commonwealth's economic or geopolitical significance, but 
that was very much what Gaitskell was doing here in order to turn round the 
similarly framed arguments being deployed by his deputy leader, George Brown, 
and others in favour of European entry.
Gaitskell was, however, adding these traditionally Tory ways of thinking about the 
Commonwealth to the Labour lexicon just at the point where they were losing their 
potency. He may have done so armed with the critical views heard from 
Commonwealth Labour leaders at their recent conference, which ended with a 
communiqué stating that 'if Britain were to enter the Common Market on the basis 
of what has so far been agreed great damage would inevitably be done to many 
countries in the Commonwealth'.91 New Commonwealth states like Nigeria were 
particularly critical of what was termed the neo-colonialism of Associated Overseas 
Territory [AOT] status, with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana comparing the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome to the 1884 Treaty of Berlin that divided up Africa.92 In a paper to the 
Shadow Cabinet in April 1962 Denis Healey acknowledged that AOT status was felt 
to involve competition with the privileged position of former French colonies, 
discrimination against tropical foodstuffs and subordination to Europe. Only the 
West Indies were prepared to accept it.93 Yet Ghana was already trading more with 
the Six than Britain. The amendments to AOT status under the Yaoundé 
Convention signed in July 1963, meanwhile, did much to mollify the Nigerians. 
That year Nigeria opened negotiations for AOT status.94 
Harold Wilson, who was to succeed Gaitskell as leader after the latter's sudden 
death in January 1963 and in many ways shared the latter's position on Europe, 
had already pointed out in 1960 that many in the Commonwealth were supportive 
of consolidation of European markets, hoping that it would facilitate access for 
their goods.95 Indeed, a Fabian pamphlet in 1962 pointed out that this was already 
happening.96 The party's leading pro-European, Roy Jenkins, may have been 
exaggerating when in June 1961 he argued that most of the Commonwealth 
objections to European entry came from New Zealand,97 but Gaitskell was 
certainly also exaggerating the objections from elsewhere.
Inter-Commonwealth trade was just not as important either for Britain or the other 
territories as it had been even under the Attlee government. Nonetheless Attlee's 
former President of the Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, still clearly hankered over 
the old bulk purchase agreement arrangements. These formed the centrepiece of 
his ten point plan for Commonwealth development of May 1963 in the aftermath 
of the failure of Macmillan's European negotiations.98 It did not seem to occur to 
him that countries that objected to AOT status would be no more willing to sign up 
for this form of neo-colonialism either. They indeed still featured among many 
more references to the Commonwealth than ever before in a Labour manifesto 
during the 1964 election.
This enthusiasm was despite a number of changes which had undermined the 
traditional military and economic functions of the Commonwealth. For instance, in 
a paper shortly before that election Cunningham complained that in the thirteen 
years of Tory rule British trade with the Commonwealth had declined from 44 to 
30 per cent of the total.99 Yet this was hardly surprising since most British colonies 
had removed their preferences in favour of British goods by 1952.100 Even in 
Australia and New Zealand James Callaghan, the shadow colonial secretary, was 
struck by the diminishing importance of imperial preference. Following his 1958 
Commonwealth tour he reported that these two Old Commonwealth states were 
'almost resigned to Britain entering' the Common Market. New Zealand, he also 
noted, were already negotiating directly with Commonwealth countries over trade 
deals.
Callaghan was no more sanguine about the military dimension of the 
Commonwealth.101 Gaitskell may have played this up in 1962. Four years earlier 
Callaghan was instead reporting his doubts about the utility of the Singapore base, 
if not yet of the East of Suez role. A year earlier he had also suggested 
reorganising the machinery of government handling Commonwealth and colonial 
affairs at the 1957 Commonwealth Labour conference.102 The idea of 
amalgamating the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office was 
subsequently considered by Hatch in 1960, only to be rejected on the grounds that 
Commonwealth countries would object.103 With the Tories having combined the 
two offices under one minister from July 1962 onwards, however, such objections 
increasingly had less weight. Indeed, a paper from the former diplomat, Geoffrey 
McDermott, in 1963 advocated going further through creating a Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. McDermott's rationale was that with Labour already 
committed to ministry of overseas aid and of disarmament then some 
consolidation was required.104  
In responding to McDermott's paper, Cunningham reflected that the 
Commonwealth's 'physical institutions are few and growing fewer and weaker'. 
Hatch in 1960 had suggested replacing British ministries with a Commonwealth 
Secretariat as a means of tackling this deficiency. Cunningham in 1964 was more 
pessimistic: 'I believe the Commonwealth relationship is bound to weaken and 
eventually disappear between Britain and the Asian-African countries, leaving only 
its hard rock foundation, Canada, Australia and New Zealand'.105 Yet it was the old 
Commonwealth, and its old functions, that were most conspicuously disappearing. 
Internal racial tensions removed South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in 1961 and 
1965 respectively. Trade ties were weaker. The questioning of the East of Suez 
role, which was steadily growing on the backbenches in the run-up to Labour's 
return to power in the 1964 election,106 was also to undermine the military 
dimension of the Commonwealth. 
Ironically it was arguably Callaghan, who had spotted these developments 
relatively early, who was among those most fiercely resisting their consequences 
as the incoming Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1964. Yet his rationale for doing so 
reflected the ways in which the Commonwealth had changed. Callaghan, for 
instance, proved very reluctant to devalue sterling despite enormous pressures to 
do so in large measure because of a sense of obligation to maintain the value of 
former colonies' sterling balances and protect them from the resulting impact on 
their dollar trade.107 It was the new Commonwealth that had emerged during the 
Attlee government that he was thus defending, and not the old Commonwealth of 
economic and military ties for which Gaitskell had belatedly become the most 
committed of Labour standard-bearers.
Part of Gaitskell's rationale for doing so was, of course, political. The Tories' 
European turn gave Labour an opportunity to seize the imperial, patriotic card. 
This opportunism clearly informed the accusations thrown at the Conservatives in 
Labour's 1964 manifesto that Macmillan's entry terms 'would have forced us to 
treat 'the Commonwealth] as third class nations'.108 The Commonwealth was 
commandeered as a trope to serve a Labour patriotic cause. This was also 
apparent in Labour's attempts to revive the Commonwealth as a geopolitical entity 
in a new setting. As George Thomson later put it: 'We appointed a minister to the 
United Nations, and we were going to form a great Commonwealth group at the 
United Nations, and we were all going to be a force in world affairs'. This was for 
Thomson 'a deeply disillusioning experience',109 but it was also one which built on 
a tradition of Labour thinking about the Commonwealth. This was not simply the 
British-led military arrangement that the Commonwealth had been in two world 
wars, but an attempt to use it as an example of multi-racial global partnership. 
This included the 1964 idea of a Commonwealth consultative assembly which had 
echoes of the thinking in Labour and the New Social Order. 
The manifesto proudly affirmed Labour's role in the transition of empire into 
Commonwealth, claiming 'No nobler transformation is recorded in the story of the 
human race'. The incorporation of Britain into that transformed, multi-racial entity 
was hinted at in the promise to legislate against racial discrimination, though 
tempered by the commitment to control immigration.110 This suggests that, 
beneath the fine words, there remained a certain instrumentality. Nonetheless, a 
substantial, and lasting, change in the conception of the Commonwealth had been 
effected. In 1964 Cunningham argued that 'The Commonwealth is all in the 
mind'.111 It certainly developed as a concept over time in the minds of Labour 
figures. However, it was the multi-racial Commonwealth of free (and varied) 
nations that Labour thinkers from Lansbury onwards had spoken of, rather than 
the backward-looking White core which Cunningham himself evoked, that 
increasingly sprang to mind.
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